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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act, which
amended the procedures that apply to large interstate class actions.
In doing so, Congress declared that it sought "to assure fairer out-
comes for class members and defendants."I In addition to changing
class action results, CAFA significantly expanded federal jurisdiction
2
over class actions and mass actions. CAFA thus marked a watershed
for the federal courts, which have limited jurisdiction, unlike most
state courts that have general jurisdiction.
Before enacting CAFA, Congress determined that class action lit-
igation requires federal attention and, if certain requirements are
met, federal courts obtain jurisdiction. Congress relied on specific
findings that class action lawsuits are "an important and valuable part
of the legal system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution
of legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the claims to be
aggregated into a single action against a defendant that has allegedly
caused harm." 4 But Congress also found "abuses of the class action
device."' While some of the abuses related directly to the parties and
attorneys involved in class actions, other abuses were specifically tied
to a concern that federal principles had been compromised. For ex-
1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 1 (a), 119 Stat.
4, 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See infra Part II.A.1.
3. However, CAFA reserved for the states two types of large class actions that are
local in nature: (1) Local controversies remain in state court where (a) more than
two-thirds of the class members are from the forum state and either the primary de-
fendant ora significant defendant is from that state, (b) the principal injuries were
incurred in that state, and (c) no other class action on the issue has been filed in the
preceding three years. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (4) (2006). And (2) Defendant's home
state may dictate that the action remain in state court when between one-third and
two-thirds of the class members are from the forum state, and the primary defendants
are from that state. Id. § 1332(d) (3). The first exception is mandatory; the second is
discretionary. Id. CAFA also reserved Delaware's jurisdiction over most corporate
cases already addressed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See id.
§ 1332 (d) (9). CAFA leaves out many civil rights class actions based on a concern that
sovereign immunity defenses should remain intact. See id. § 1332(d) (5).
4. CAFA § 2(a) (1).
5. Id. § 2(a)(2).
[Vol. 36:41398
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ample, Congress found that class action abuses had "undermine [d]
the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and
the concept of diversityjurisdiction as intended by the framers of the
United States Constitution."6 Significantly, Congress determined that
state and local courts had been "keeping cases of national importance
out of Federal court," occasionally have acted "in ways that demon-
strate bias against out-of-State defendants," and have entered judg-
ments that "impose their view of the law on other States and bind the
rights of the residents of those States."7
CAFA addressed these problems by changing diversity require-
ments, prerequisites to removal, and removal procedures for class ac-
8
tions that include more than 100 members and involve total claims of
more than $5 million.9 Diversityjurisdiction is substantially different
for these cases. CAFA softened citizenship requirements by eliminat-
ing the complete diversity rule; CAFA also increased the total-amount-
in-controversy threshold but allowed aggregation of class members'
claims.' ° Similarly, CAFA removal procedures are more generous.
Any defendant may remove, regardless of consent by other defen-
dants, and CAFA eliminated the outer time limit for removal from
state to federal court.'" Additionally, CAFA granted defendants the
right to immediately appeal a district court's decision to remand to
state court after removal.
12
Statistics verify that CAFA has been effective in the five years since
it was adopted. The FederalJudicial Center examined the period July
1, 2001 through June 30, 2007, and found an overall increase of se-
venty-two percent in class action activity.' 3 Most importantly, the Fed-
eral Judicial Center compared pre- and post-CAFA periods and de-
clared "a dramatic increase in the number of diversity class actions
filed as original proceedings in the federal courts." 14 This means that
more plaintiffs initially filed class actions in federal courts after CAFA
6. Id. § 2(a)(4).
7. Id. § 2(a) (4) (A)-(C).
8. 28 U.S. C. § 1332(d) (5) (B) (2006).
9. Id. § 1332(d) (2).
10. Id. § 1332(d) (6).
11. Id.§ 1453(b).
12. Id. § 1453(c)(1).
13. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED.JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF
THE CLAss ACnON FAIRNESS Acr OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL CouRTs: FOURTH INTERIM
REPORT TO THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON CIVIL RULES 1 (2008),
available at http://www. c.gov/pubfic/pdfnsf/lookup/cafaO408.pdf/$file/cafaO408.pdf
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became effective. While defense removals to federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction initially increased following CAFA, the report
stated that these increases had been "trending downward. " 5 Interes-
tingly, while the increase in diversity class actions as original federal
court proceedings has been widespread, defense removals "are more
varied by district and circuit." 6 Some observers have speculated that
this is in some part a reaction to developments in the CAFA case law,
which has varied widely by district and circuit."
While a direct answer to this speculation is beyond the scope of
this article, there is no doubt that by creating a right to immediate
appeal from remand decisions, CAFA has sponsored ample and as-
sorted case law on diversity and removal requirements. Satisfaction of
the amount in controversy requirement has garnered significant at-
tention in the federal courts of appeals. Because CAFA permits ag-
gregation of all class member claims and removal is often determined
at the pleadings stage, litigation has focused on who bears the burden
of proving the amount in controversy and how that burden is satisfied.
CAFA is silent on both counts. Prior to CAFA, Supreme Court
precedent placed the burden of proof to satisfy all jurisdictional re-
quirements-including the amount in controversy-on the party
seeking federal jurisdiction. is In removal cases, that burden falls to
the defendant. 19 Prior to CAFA, Supreme Court precedent articulated
the standard of proof for the amount in controversy in different cir-
cumstances as "to a legal certainty" and "by a preponderance of the
evidence. 2 °
Post-CAFA, the federal courts of appeals so far are unanimous in
15. Id. at 2. Lee and Willging note that "we cannot determine whether the de-
clining number of removals [post-CAFA] indicates that there are fewer class actions in
the state courts and thus fewer to remove, or determine whether the declining num-
ber of removals indicates that class action defendants in the state courts are choosing
to remove fewer cases to federal court." Id. at 7.
16. Id.atIO-11.
17. Terry Carter, A Step Up in Class, A.B.A.J., May 2008, at 22, 23-24.
18. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189
(1936).
19. See, e.g., Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P'ship, 194 F.3d 1072, 1079 (10th Cir.
1999); 15JAMEsWM. MOORE ETAL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACCE § 102.21[3] [a] (3d ed.
2010).
20. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)
(sum claimed by plaintiff controls the amount in controversy if the claim is made in
good faith; "[i] t must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than
thejurisdictional amount tojustify dismissal"); McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189 ("[T] he court
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concluding that CAFA did not alter who bears the burden of proving
the requisite amount in controversy upon removal-it remains on the
party seeking federaljurisdiction. But post-CAFA, the federal courts
of appeals have split on what is the correct standard of proof for de-
termining whether the amount in controversy is satisfied. The Third
Circuit has embraced the legal-certainty test;22 four circuits-the
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh-have espoused the preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence test;2 3 the First, Second, and Seventh circuits
24have adopted the "reasonable probability" test; and the Ninth Cir-
cuit has adopted a combination of the legal-certainty and preVonder-
ance-of-the-evidence tests depending on the circumstances. 5 Only
the Fifth and Tenth circuits appear to have not yet reached the issue.
This article discusses the circuit split on the standard of proof for
determining the amount in controversy in CAFA removal cases. Sec-
tion II provides additional background including the history and pur-
pose of CAFA and how CAFA relaxed federal removal requirements
yet did not alter which party bears the burden of proving the amount
in controversy.27 Additionally, the first section discusses Supreme
Court precedent on the standard of proof for determining the
amount in controversy, particularly in removal cases.28 Section III
analyzes the standards of proof adopted by various courts of appeals
when determining the amount in controversy following CAFA remov-
29al. Section IV concludes that the proper standard of proof requires
the removing defendant to prove the amount in controversy by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in CAFA litigation.0
21. See Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 2008); Block-
buster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469,
473 (3d Cir. 2006); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir.
2006); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005).
22. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2007); Morgan, 471
F.3d at 473.
23. SeeBell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 2009); Strawn, 530 F.3d at
297-98; Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401,404 (6th Cir. 2007);
Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184,1208 (11th Cir. 2007); Miedema v. Maytag
Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2006).
24. SeeAmoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 2009);
Brill, 427 F.3d at 448-49.
25. See Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2007);
Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683, 683 n.8.
26. For a district court decision on the issue, see Apodaca v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.
07-cv-00937-EWN-MEH, 2008 WL 113844, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 8, 2008).
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infta Part IV.
2010]
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Purpose of CAFA
Congress noted that it was the fourth Congress to consider an
overhaul of the class action statutes.31 In the public law passed by
both houses and signed by President George W. Bush, Congress iden-
tified four specific findings that supported the new law. Two findings
related to the general importance of class actions and concerns about
whether class action practice was consistent with federalism principles
in diversity cases. The Senate Report noted that class action lawsuits
are "the only mechanism that has been successful in imposing liability
on some industries."32 A minority view was that class actions have al-
lowed plaintiffs with small claims tojoin together and pursue legal ac-
tion when individual litigation might not otherwise be warranted.33
The Senate Report commented, however, that class action plain-
tiffs' lawyers had eroded federalism by manipulating pleadings to en-
sure their cases remain at the state level, where judges have reputa-
tions for easy certification and settlement approval.34  Pleadings
affected federaljurisdiction in two ways-by adding parties to destroy
diversity or by eliminating parties with claims of more than $75,000.
5
Congress's third and fourth findings focused on "abuses of the class
action device" and included unfair or unjust litigation results.36 For
instance, Congress found some class members had received "little or
no benefit" when counsel received large fees and class members re-
ceived coupons and also Congress found some class members re-
ceived "unjustified awards ... at the expense of other class mem-
bers. ,7
Not surprisingly then, Congress declared that CAFA's purposes
31. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 1-2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3-5 (act first consi-
dered by 105th Congress).
32. Id. at 54, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 50. This same section of the reports
also stated that this result will be "destroy[ed]" by increasing removal of state class
actions to federal court. Id.
33. Id. at 83, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 76 (minority view).
34. Id. at 4, 14, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5, 14 (majority view).
35. Id. at 26-27, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 26-27.
36. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 2(a) (2), 119 Stat. 4, 4
(2005).
37. Id. § 2(a) (3). Other abuses noted are that class actions have "harmed class
members with legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly" and
"confusing notices are published that prevent class members from being able to fully
understand and effectively exercise their rights." Id. § 2(a) (2) (A), (3) (C).
1402 [Vol. 36:4
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fall along two lines-improving recoveries to class members and
stopping the attrition of federal court involvement in the litigation of
large interstate class actions.38 Specifically, Congress stated that CAFA
would seek to "assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members
with legitimate claims" and "restore the intent of the framers of the
United States Constitution by providing for Federal court considera-
tion of interstate cases of national importance under diversityjurisdic-
tion."' 9 While Congress fulfilled the first purpose by changing settle-
ment requirements and addressing coupon provisions, Congress
addressed the second purpose by opening federal courts to more class
action litigation by easing diversity and removal rules.
1. CAFA Expanded Federal Jurisdiction in Diversity Class Actions
Traditionally, all class representatives must be diverse from all de-
fendants-the complete diversity rule.41 If one named plaintiff has
more than $75,000 in controversy, the district court may include all
class members' claims in its discretion under its supplementaljurisdic-
tion.42
Under CAFA, however, at a minimum, one class member must be
diverse from one defendant, and the total amount in controversy
43must exceed $5 million, excluding interest and costs. It does not
matter if one plaintiffs claim exceeds $75,000, since CAFA considers
all claims in the aggregation."
Removal procedures are also relaxed under CAFA. Traditionally,
only out-of-state defendants may remove cases to federal court based
on diversity. 45 Under CAFA, any defendant may remove, even a resi-
46dent of the forum state. Traditionally, all defendants must consent
to removal47 and there is a thirty-day deadline for removal, triggered
38. Id. § 2(b) (1)-(2). Congress also identified a third purpose-to "benefit so-
ciety by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices." Id. § 2(b) (3).
39. Id. § 2(b) (1)-(2).
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712-1715 (2006).
41. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806).
42. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2).
44. Id. § 1332(d) (6).
45. Id. § 1441(b).
46. Id. § 1453.
47. Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900)
(removal requires the consent of all defendants); see, e.g., Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible
Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533-34 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the "defen-
dant ha[d] 30 days from the date of service to remove a case to federal district court,
with the consent of the remaining defendants.").
2010] 1403
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by the date a "removable pleading" is received, but limited by cut-off
for removal that ends one year from the commencement of the ac-
tion.4s Under CAFA, no consent is required and the statute erased the
one-year limit.
4 9
2. Interlocutory Appeal Procedures Generated Case Law Quickly
CAFA altered the rules for appellate review of removal. Tradi-
tionally, no appellate review is permitted from a district court decision
to remand a case to state court after removal.50 Under CAFA, appel-
late review of a decision granting or denying a motion to remand is
allowed under strict timelines. District court decisions may be ap-
pealed if review is sought "not more than 10 days after entry of the
order."5 ' Additionally, if the court of appeals accepts review, it must
decide the appeal "not later than 60 days after the date on which such
appeal was filed," 52 with the possibility of a ten-day extension.5
B. CAFA Relaxed Federal Removal Requirements, but Did Not Alter
Which Party Bears Burden of Proof
The federal courts are courts of limitedjurisdiction and "possess
only that power authorized by Constitution and statute. 5 4 Congress
has established the amount in controversy necessary to sustain federal
jurisdiction in diversity cases and therefore Congress has the authority
to modify these requirements.55 In the past, Congress has revised the
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
49. Id. § 1453(b).
50. Id. § 1447(d).
51. Id. § 1453(c) (1) (West 2009). The original language of this provision stated
a petition was timely if filed "not less than 7 days after entry of the order." Spivey v.
Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 983 (7th Cir. 2008). Described as both a "gaffe" and
"garble," the language "attracted considerable attention." Id. at 983-84 (citing au-
thorities). Congress finally revised the language in 2009. SeeStatutory Time-Periods
Technical Amendments Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-16, 123 Stat. 1607 (2009).
52. 28U.S.C.§ 1453(c)(2).
53. Id. § 1453(c) (3). A ten day extension may be granted "for good cause shown
and in the interests ofjustice." Id. § 1453(c) (3) (B). An extension for a longer pe-
riod may be granted if all parties agree. Id. § 1453(c) (3) (A).
54. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989) (holding that jurisdiction is only
what is expressly granted within the text of the Federal Torts Claims Act, which is li-
mited to "civil actions on claims against the United States").
55. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 ("Whatever we say regarding the scope ofjurisdiction
conferred by a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress."). SeeOwen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373, n.13 (1978) (noting that "com-
plete diversity is not a 'constitutional requirement'" but has been adopted by court
1404 [Vol. 36:4
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amount in controversy, which is a statutory requirement, not a consti-S 56
tutional requirement. As a statutory requirement, courts have ap-
plied the amount in controversy by examining the language of any
amendment and construing it to give effect to Congress's intent.
The same analysis applies to determining which party bears the bur-
den of proof on the amount in controversy. Congress has the authori-
ty to prescribe who bears the burden of proof on the amount in con-
troversy. This has never been incorporated into a federal statute, but
has been the subject of case law. 5'
The federal courts of appeals that have considered the issue have
held that, under CAFA, the party asserting federal jurisdiction-
whether as a matter of original or removal jurisdiction-bears the
burden of proving that issue. 59 Two primary rules of law have been
cited in favor of this conclusion. First, federal courts have long rec-
ognized that they have limitedjurisdiction and that "all doubts" must
60
be resolved againstjurisdiction. Second, courts presume that Con-
gress is aware of the existing rule and, if it had intended to change the
rule, Congress would have done so expressly in CAFA as it did with
61
other amendments that changed diversity requirements. Yet CAFA
decision; Congress has amended diversityjurisdiction statute but left complete diver-
sity rule intact); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ("The policy of the statute
calls for its strict construction.").
56. For example, article III, section 2, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution states,
The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-
between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In comparison, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides that the requisite amount in controversy for
diversityjurisdiction is $75,000.00.
57. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553-54 (2005)
(noting complete diversity rule is neither constitutional or statutory but courts apply
in light of purpose of rule); id. at 568 (" [T] he authoritative statement is the statutory
text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material."); see also Clark v. Paul
Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (holding every plaintiffmust separately satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement).
58. SeeMcNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 188-89
(1936). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (lacking any express determination as to who bears
the burden of proof).
59. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,561 (1992); Miedemav. Maytag
Corp., 450 F.3d 1322,1328-29 (11th Cir. 2006); Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d
1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2006); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676,
678 (9th Cir. 2006); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th
Cir. 2005).
60. Hahn v. PepsiCo, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
61. Seediscussion in Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683-85. See also Goodyear Atomic Corp.
2010] 1405
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is silent on the burden of proof.
The Senate Report persuaded some district courts that held that
CAFA had altered the burden of proof and placed it on the plaintiffs'
shoulders in all instances, including removal.6' The Report indicated
that a majority of the judiciary committee intended that the burden of
proof shift to the plaintiffs. 6s The courts of appeals that have consi-
dered the language in the Senate Report have rejected it, reasoning
that CAFA is not ambiguous and, therefore, legislative history does
not factor into the courts' analysis of the statute.6 While some have
commented that this conclusion rests on a "useful fiction," the gen-
eral consensus is that "it may not be possible to truly determine con-
gressional intent on this point, and therefore, the existing rule should
remain in force.,
65
C. Supreme Court Precedent on the Standard of Prooffor Amount in
Controversy
The Supreme Court has recognized that the amount in contro-
versy requirement "is meant to ensure that a dispute is sufficiently
important to warrant federal-court attention. 66 In 1938, the Supreme
Court in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company v. Red Cab Company estab-
lished a two-pronged test for determining whether the jurisdictional
minimum has been met in a matter removed to federal court based
67on diversity ofjurisdiction. First, the complaint creates a rebuttablepresumption that the amount of damages sought is a good faith
v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) ("We generally presume that Congress is know-
ledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts.").
62. See, e.g., Berryv. Am. Express Publ'g, Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118,1122 (C.D.
Cal. 2005), abrogated by Abrego, 443 F.3d at 685.
63. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005) reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 40:
The Committee intends this subsection [the amount in controversy] to be
interpreted expansively. If a purported class action is removed pursuant to
these jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the bur-
den of demonstrating that the removal was improvident .... [T]he court
should err in favor of exercisingjurisdiction over the case.
64. See, e.g., Brill, 427 F.3d at 448.
65. StephenJ. Shapiro, Applying theJurisdictional Provisions of the Class Action Fair-
ness Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 77, 98
(2007). See also Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (holding that, in a bank-
ruptcy case construing U.S. bankruptcy code, the uncertainties surrounding docu-
ments and hearings with regard to determining legislative intent illustrated the im-
portance of relying upon statutory text rather than on legislative intent).
66. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 562 (2005).
67. 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938) [hereinafter Red Cab].
[Vol. 36:41406
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statement of the actual amount in controversy. 68 Second, "[i] t must
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the ju-
risdictional amount to justify dismissal." 69
In Red Cab, an Indiana corporation sued a Minnesota corporation
in Indiana state court.70 The plaintiff sought to enforce an insurance
contract for workers' compensation claims." The damages sought in
the complaint were $4000, which met the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement at the time.72 The defendant removed to federal court and
the plaintiff amended the complaint, still alleging $4000 in damages,
but attaching an exhibit that stated the actual total amount expended
for the claims was $1380.89. The federal court entered judgment for
74the plaintiff and an appeal was taken. The court of appeals refused
to decide the merits, stating it lackedjurisdiction because the amount
75in controversy was not met.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals and remanded for proceedings on the merits of the appeal. Al-
though the Court began by noting that Congress intended "drastically
to restrict federaljurisdiction in controversies between citizens of dif-
ferent states," it also held that "unless the law gives a different rule,
the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently
made in good faith. 76 The Court continued: "It must appear to a le-
gal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount tojustify dismissal. 77 Federal jurisdiction is not defeated by
78subsequent events, such as actual recovery or a valid defense. In-
stead, the legal-certainty test results in dismissal when it is applied to
the "face of the pleadings, [if] it is apparent ... that the plaintiff can-
not recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is sa-
tisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover
that amount." 
79
The Court explained that, in a removed action, a presumption is
68. Id. at 288.
69. Id. at 289.
70. Id. at 284.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 285. The amount-in-controversy requirement at the time of the case
was $3000. Id. at 286.
73. Id. at 285.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 288.
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appropriate when "a large amount" is sought in the complaint be-
cause collusion is unlikely and the opportunity for the defendant to
remove is limited by a short deadline. If a plaintiff were allowed to
"reduce the amount of his demand to defeat federal jurisdiction
[then] the defendant's supposed statutory right of removal would be
subject to the plaintiffs caprice." 8' Although not presented on the
facts before it, the Court observed that the plaintiff has an alternative:
sue for less than the jurisdictional amount even though entitled to
more.82 In that event, the defendant cannot remove. Applying these
rules to the case before it, the Supreme Court held the defendant was
entitled to remove to federal court because the requisite amount in
controversy appeared on the face of the complaint and "a reduction
of the amount claimed after removal did not take away that privi-
lege. "4
The "legal-certainty" test has controlled the analysis of the
amount in controversy requirement since Red Cab." Under this test,
the party asserting federal jurisdiction "must establish merely that it
does not appear to a legal certainty that the claim is below the jurisdic-
tional minimum. Thus, under this standard, courts must be very con-
fident that a party cannot recover the jurisdictional amount before
dismissing the case for want ofjurisdiction.
8 6
Before deciding Red Cab, the Supreme Court determined which
party shouldered the burden of proving the amount in controversy
and by what standard it must be proven where jurisdiction is disputed
or unclear. In McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the district
court granted an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a state
law. 87 On a direct appeal, the Supreme Court questioned jurisdic-
tion;88 the action had been filed originally in federal court but the
80. Id. at 290-91.
81. Id. at 293.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 296.
85. MOORE, supra note 19, § 102.104[1], at 102-168 (3d ed. 1999). See also id. at
n. 2 (citing authorities from each federal court of appeal); 14AA CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3702, at 17 (3d ed. 1998) (noting
the legal-certainty test is "the universal test in the context of actions that originate in
the federal courts"); see also id. at 28 ("it must appear to a legal certainty that the
plaintiff's claim is really for less than thejurisdictional amount tojustify dismissal for
lack of subject matterjurisdiction.").
86. MOORE, supra note 19, §102.106[1], at 102-171 & n.5 (citing authorities).
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amount in controversy could not be determined on the face of the
complaint.8 9 The complaint asserted federal questionjurisdiction and
raised constitutional issues, but failed to allege the amount in contro-
versy. 9° The value of the business interests affected by the state statute
was alleged, but the "value of the right" was not alleged.9' The Su-
preme Court held that the party asserting jurisdiction bears the bur-
den of proof and, if challenged by the opponent, must support the
amount "by competent proof" and "the court may demand that the
party alleging jurisdictionjustify his allegations by a preponderance of
evidence. 92 The Supreme Court reversed the matter and remanded
to dismiss the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction 9 '
In deciding removed cases, courts of appeals have sought to
blend the legal-certainty and preponderance-of-the-evidence stan-
dards by focusing on whether the complaint alleges damages in excess
94of thejurisdictional minimum. If the complaint alleges damages ex-
ceeding the jurisdictional minimum, then the party challenging juris-
diction must show to a legal certainty that the amount cannot be re-
covered.95 However, if the complaint alleges damages less than the
jurisdictional amount, the circuit courts have split on what the defen-
dant must do to successfully remove the case. 6 While mere conclu-
sory allegations are insufficient, some courts presume the complaint is
correct, but allow the defendant to establish jurisdiction by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.97 Any rebuttal by the plaintiff must be to a
legal certainty in order to remand to state court.98 Similarly, where
the complaint alleges damages of an uncertain amount, a removing
defendant must establish the amount in controversy by a preponder-
89. Id. at 178-81.
90. Id. at 180-81. The law applicable at the time required a federal question and
$3000 as the minimum amount in controversy. Id. at 181.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 189.
93. Id. at 190.
94. MOORE, supra note 19, at 102-193 (citing authorities).
95. Id. at 102-89 & n.12. See also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir.
1992) ("The court may demand that the party allegingjurisdiction justify his allega-
tions by a preponderance of evidence.").
96. MooRE, supra note 19, at 102-189. See also WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 52 n.24
(citing authorities).
97. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567 (holding that a conclusory allegation is insufficient to
remove the case); see also MooRE, supra note 19, at 102-190 & n.1 7 (citing authorities);
WRiGHT, supra note 85, at 52 n.24 (citing authorities).
98. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir. 1995). See also MOORE
supra note 19, at 102-190 n.18 (citing authorities).
2010] 1409
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ance of the evidence.'9 The Third Circuit has differed, holding the
removing defendant must prove to a legal certainty that the plaintiff
can recover the jurisdictional amount. This circuit split has contin-
ued to play out and perhaps become exacerbated under CAFA re-
moval.
III. CIRCUIT ANALYSIS OF STANDARD OF PROOF UNDER CAFA
The standard of proof in CAFA-removal cases is different from
circuit to circuit. Courts have formulated four tests: the (1) legal cer-
tainty, (2) preponderance of the evidence, (3) reasonable probability,
and (4) combination tests. Despite differences, there is overlap in
how these standards are articulated and applied. In many circuits, the
factor determining which standard applies is the ad damnum clause in
the plaintiffs complaint. Some courts, such as the Eighth Circuit,
have rejected that factor as determinative. 1
A. Legal-Certainty Test
The Third Circuit used the legal-certainty test to analyze a case
where the plaintiff class alleged damages under $5 million to avoidCAFA ,102
CAFA removal. In Morgan v. Gay, the consumer class brought de-
ceptive-sales practices claims in NewJersey state court related to sale
of skin cream. 13 The named plaintiff expressly limited the request for
damages to less than $5 million in the complaint. 104 After removal to
federal court under CAFA, the district court ordered remand because
the amount in controversy was lacking, given plaintiffs allegations of
damages. 05 The Third Circuit affirmed.'06 Rather than relying on
99. Gilman v. BHC Sec., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418,1428 (2d Cir 1996); Sanchez v. Mo-
numental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996).
100. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 194-99 (3d Cir. 2007); Samuel-
Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2004).
101. See, e.g., Bell v. Hershey, 557 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2009).
102. Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2006).
103. Id. at 471.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 477. The court's opinion adds this caution:
The plaintiffs in state court should not be permitted to ostensibly limit their
damages to avoid federal court only to receive an award in excess of the fed-
eral amount in controversy requirement. The plaintiff has made her choice
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cases directly addressing the legal-certainty test,10 7 the Third Circuit
relied on a Seventh Circuit decision to hold that the legal-certainty
test applied, even though the Seventh Circuit decision actually consi-
dered a complaint where damages were unspecified and that court ul-
timately applied the reasonable-probability test.'°
More recently, the Third Circuit has confirmed that it will apply
the legal-certainty test to analyze removal questions under CAFA's
amount in controversy provisions.109 In Frederico v. Home Depot, the
plaintiff class sued Home Depot claiming that it had violated the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.110 The claims arose after the plaintiff
rented a truck from a Home Depot store to use for seventy-five mi-
nutes. 1 ' According to the terms of the rental agreement, the plaintiff
would pay $19.00 for the first seventy-five minutes, and $5.00 for each
additional fifteen minutes the truck was overdue. '12 Plaintiff at-
tempted to return the rental truck at 7:38 p.m., but was told that the
rental department was closed-even though the store was open-and
she would have to return the truck the next morning when the rental
107. Morgan was decided before Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n, which ad-
dressed the same factual scenario: both plaintiff classes had limited their demand for
recovery to under $5 million. Id. at 471; Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n, 479
F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2007). In Morgan, the Third Circuit acknowledged in a foot-
note that the Ninth Circuit had considered and reserved a similar issue in Abrego.
Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474 n.5. In fact, Morgan is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's lat-
er decision in Lowdermilk, which in turn cites Morgan as consistent with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision to adopt the legal-certainty standard. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 999.
108. The Third Circuit relied on Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d
446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005), which is discussed in detail infra Part III.C. Morgan's re-
liance on Brill is misplaced for two reasons. First, in Brill the scenario was not the
same as in Morgan. Id. The Brillplaintiffs did not specify or limit the damages sought
in the complaint against Countrywide for the advertising faxes. Id. Conversely, the
Morgan plaintiffs specified that they would not seek damages exceeding $5 million.
Morgan, 471 F.3d at 472. Second, the Third Circuit in Morgan pieced together quotes
from Brill and claimed that Brill required the defendant to meet the legal-certainty
standard. Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474. Brill actually adopted the reasonable-probability
standard. Brill, 427 F.3d at 447. The Third Circuit's reliance on the Seventh Circuit
is undercut even further by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Meridian Security Insur-
ance Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 2006), a non-CAFA case that ex-
plained that the "reasonable-probability" language had created a number of prob-
lems for the district courts in analyzing removal issues, and that the "legal-certainty"
language had created even more confusion. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit in Meri-
dian adopted the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, which it will likely apply in
CAFA removal cases. Id. at 541-42.
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department reopened.113  Plaintiff returned the truck and paid
$287.14 for the rental the next day.! 4 After a class action was filed in
state court, Home Depot filed a notice of removal and the plaintiff
did not seek remand. Home Depot moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim, and the district court granted Home De-
pot's motion; plaintiff appealed.16 The court of appeals considered
the question of federal jurisdiction sua sponte.
17
The court of appeals exhaustively reviewed Morgan and non-
CAFA case law from the Third Circuit and the United States Supreme
Court 18 to reach two precepts that the court said were "crystal clear":
(1) where a complaint limits damages to less than $5 million, then the
"defendant seeking removal must prove to a legal certainty that plain-
tiff can recover thejurisdictional amount;" and (2) where a complaint
does not limit damages to less than $5 million, then "the case must be
remanded if it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot re-
cover the jurisdictional amount." "19
The court of appeals read the Supreme Court decision in Red
Cab 12 as holding that "when a case is brought in federal court, 'the
sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparendy made
in good faith.' [And] ... if 'from the face of the pleadings, it is ap-
parent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the• ,,• • • 121
amount claimed"' then the case will be dismissed. The court of ap-
peals then turned to the Supreme Court's decision in McNutt,122 limit-
ing its holding to apply only when the jurisdictional dispute about
amount in controversy "surrounded factual matters." In McNutt, the
Third Circuit observed that the complaint included no allegations
about the amount and no evidence or findings addressed the issue.
1
21
In that context, the court could require proof by a preponderance of
113. Id.
114. Id. at 192.
115. Id. at 191.
116. Id. at 192.
117. Id.
118. Fredericoreliedon Samuel-Bassett. Id. at 193. (citingSamuel-Bassettv. KiaMo-
tors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). Additionally, Frederico discussed Red
Caband McNuttat length, stating that these decisions created the "template" for fed-
eraljurisdiction challenges. Id. at 193-94.
119. Id. at 197.
120. 303 U.S. 283 (1938). See infra note 254 and accompanying textforadditional
discussion.
121. Frederico, 507 F.3d at 194 (quoting Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 288).
122. 298 U.S. 178 (1936). See infra note 277 and accompanying text for additional
discussion.
123. Frederico, 507 F.3d at 194.
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the evidence.2 4 When relevant facts were not in dispute, then there
was no need to resort to McNutt. 
2 5
Frederico concluded that the standard of proof is the same regard-
less of the scenario presented by plaintiff's complaint: The party as-
serting federal jurisdiction must show to a legal certainty that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount."' The
court of appeals reasoned the legal-certainty standard is correct be-
cause the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, entitled to choose
the preferred forum, and the defendant must overcome these pre-
sumptions.127 Regarding the complaint in Frederico, the court of ap-




Four circuits, the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh 13 have
124. Id. (citing McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189).
125. Id. (citing Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 397).
126. Id. at 196.
127. Id. at 193-96.
128. Id. at 199.
129. Strawn v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 530 F.3d 293,288-99 (4th Cir. 2008) (revers-
ing district court decision to remand under CAFA, relying on allegations in notice of
removal); see Strawn v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 513 F. Supp.2d 599 (D.W. Va. 2007) (ap-
plying preponderance-of-the-evidence standard).
130. Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 403-04 (6th Cir.
2007) (affirming district court's decision to remand under CAFA, holding defendant
failed to establish adequate amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evi-
dence; state class action complaint limited amount of claims to "less than" $4.9 mil-
lion).
131. In Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (lth Cir. 2007), affg on other
g-rounds Lowery v. Honeywell Intern, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2006), the
court of appeals first explained that in non-CAFA cases where the complaint demands
unspecified damages, the removing party must show that the damages exceed the
amount in controversy "by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 1208. The court
also cited Abregofrom the Ninth Circuit, which involved a complaint with unspecified
damages; however, the court did not address the other two tests that the Ninth Circuit
has adopted. Id. For a discussion of Ninth Circuit case law, see discussion infra Part
III.D.
In Lowery, the plaintiffs' class action complaint did not allege specific mone-
tary damages. Lowery, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. The court of appeals applied the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard to CAFA removal based on circuit precedent
because the complaint did not specify damages. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1184, 1208-10.
However, the court expressed concern that, without any factual allegations and no
evidence to determine whether the amount in controversy exceeded thejurisdictional
minimum, it could not "meaningfully apply" the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. Id. at 1210-11. Indeed, the court said to do so would be "unabashed
guesswork." Id. at 1211. Based on the record before it, the court of appeals affirmed
2010] 1413
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adopted or approved the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to
determine the amount in controversy in CAFA cases. These courts
have required the removing defendant, the proponent of federal ju-
risdiction, to show that the amount in controversy more likely than
not exceeds $5 million. In effect, this standard mirrors the rule
adopted in some circuits for non-CAFA cases that the party seeking
federal jurisdiction must show that the amount in controversy exceeds
the jurisdictional minimum.
32
In Bell v. Hershey, the Eighth Circuit analyzed a complaint that the
district court had determined was "clearly designed" to prevent the
defendant from satisfying the $5 million amount in controversy ele-
ment in CAFA.133 In Bell, the plaintiff class filed suit against The Her-
shey Company and four other chocolate manufacturers in Iowa state
court claiming that these manufacturers had conspired to fix prices,
forcing plaintiffs to pay higher prices for chocolate than they would
have otherwise paid.
3 4
The plaintiffs attempted to avoid removal, contending in the
complaint that "[CAFA] does not apply and no federal courtjurisdic-
tion is available as a basis for removal. , The complaint "limited"
damages sought to $3.75 million in compensatory damages and "no
more than" $1.24 million in attorneys' fees, for a total of less than $5
million. 136 The plaintiffs also attempted to limit the amount in con-
troversy by controlling the class composition and the underlying alle-
gation of price fixing. First, the plaintiffs limited the class to choco-
late purchasers in eight specific Iowa counties, rather than the entire137
state. Second, the plaintiffs assumed that the price fixing over-
charge was 5%, despite other allegations in the complaint that higher
price increases were in effect.'38 Finally9, the plaintiffs limited the du-
ration of the class period to six years.
Defendants filed a notice of removal and contended that if the
court conformed the damages sought to the facts alleged in the corn-
the district court's order to remand to state court. Id. at 1221.
132. See, e.g.,Advance Am. Servicing of Ark., Inc. v. McGinnis, 526F.3d 1170,1173
(8th Cir. 2008) ("A complaint will be dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdiction
if it appears to a legal certainty that the value of the claim is less than the required
amount of $75,000.").
133. 557 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2009).
134. Id. at 954.
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plaint, then the complaint demonstrated an amount in controversy in
excess of $5 million. 40 For example, defendants claimed in its notice
of removal that by increasing the assumed price-fixing percentage to
5.1% or 5.2%, which were facts alleged in the plaintiffs' petition, the
amount in controversy increased to $5.04 million. 14' Defendants also
contended that adding one month to the seventy-two-month class pe-
riod, which was consistent with the allegations in the complaint, also
established that the amount in controversy was greater than $5.04 mil-
lion. 142
The plaintiff filed a motion for remand. 4 The district court ap-
plied the legal-certainty test and found that the defendants had
"failed to prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy ex-
ceeded the jurisdictional minimum. "'44 Defendants appealed, and
the court of appeals vacated because the district court applied the
'45
wrong test.
On appeal, plaintiffs argued-citing cases from the Ninth and
Third circuits-that defendants should be required to prove to a legal
certainty that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.' 46 The
Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs argument for several reasons.
First, plaintiff's position was a departure from pre-CAFA Eighth Cir-
cuit opinions that had already adopted and applied the preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard in removal cases. The court saw no





Second, the Eighth Circuit read Red Cab as imposing the legal-...... 149
certainty test on the party trying to defeat federal jurisdiction. The
140. Id.
141. Id. at 955-56.
142. Id. at 956.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 959.
146. Id. at 957 (citing Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc., 479 F.3d 994, 1000
(9th Cir. 2007); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2006)).
147. See, e.g., Advance Am. Servicing of Ark., Inc. v. McGinnis, 526 F.3d 1170,1173
(8th Cir. 2008) (identifying the preponderance-of-the-evidence test as the correct
standard of proof to determine whether the amount in controversy exceeds thejuris-
dictional minimum); James Neff Kramper Family Farm P'ship v. IBP, Inc., 393 F.3d
828,831 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that if facts are disputed, the court may require
proof that thejurisdictional amount exceeds the statutory minimum by a preponder-
ance of the evidence); In re Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 346 F.3d
830,834 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that where the complaint is silent, the proponent of
federal jurisdiction must show that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory
minimum by a preponderance of the evidence).
148. Bell, 557 F.3d at 957.
149. Id. at 957-58. On the one hand the Eighth Circuit elaborated that when
2010] 1415
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court therefore rejected the legal-certainty standard for a removed
CAFA case because doing so would "invert[] the 'legal certainty' test
of St. Paul Mercury, by placing such a burden on the party seeking to
assert rather than defeat federal jurisdiction [and] places too high a
barrier in the path of defendants. The court implied that this re-
sult conflicted with CAFA's "primary purpose" of opening federal
courts to corporate defendants.
1
51
Third, the court of appeals recognized that using different stan-
dards of proof depending on how a complaint alleges damages may
have "unintended consequences" by subjecting defendants in the
same federal circuit to different standards of proof depending on the
state court from which the case was removed. 0' Bellpresented a para-
digm example of this "unintended consequence": Iowa prohibits a
plaintiff from making a specific demand for damages; Arkansas does
not.113 Thus, under the formulation described by the Ninth Circuit,
cases removed from Iowa courts would be subject to the preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard, while cases removed from Arkansas
courts would be subject to either the legal-certainty or the preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard, depending on what the plaintiff
pleaded in the complaint."'
With these concerns in mind, the Eighth Circuit articulated the
standard of proof for defendants seeking removal to federal court in
CAFA cases: "[A] party seeking to remove under CAFA must establish
the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence re-
gardless of whether the complaint alleges an amount below the juris-
dictional minimum." , 5 5 The Eighth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs'
efforts to limit damages to an amount below the CAFAjurisdictional
minimum. Because Iowa law forbids pleading a specific damages
plaintiff is the proponent of federaljurisdiction, the defendant must defeat by a legal
certainty. Id. at 956. On the other hand, where the defendant removes, the defen-
dant is the proponent of federaljurisdiction, and must establish amount in controver-
sy by a preponderance of evidence, which plaintiff must defeat by a legal certainty. Id.
150. Id. at 957-58 (quoting Gugielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 702
(9th Cir. 2007)) (emphasis in original).
151. Id. at 957.
152. Id. at 958.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 958. The Eighth Circuit discussed Ninth Circuit precedent in non-
CAFA cases, specifically Guglielmino. Id. at 957-58 (citing Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at
696). The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that even if it adopted the Ninth Circuit's
three-pronged formulation, that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard would
apply anyway. Id. at 959.
1416 [Vol. 36:4
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amount in the complaint, "any attempt to do so is a legal nullity" and
Bell's petition is "construed" to be one "that does not plead a specific
sum. ,16 The Eighth Circuit remanded the issue to the district court
with instructions to apply the preponderance-of-the-evidence stan-
dard.
57
Other circuits, including the Sixth15 and Eleventh, also use the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to test the amount in con-
troversy in cases removed under CAFA 1 9 In Miedema v. Maytag,'60 the
Eleventh Circuit applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
to a complaint that did not specify damages.' 6' The plaintiff consum-
er class sued Maytag in Florida state court alleging that the defen-
dant's oven contained a defective door latch that permitted heat to
escape and damaged other parts of the oven. 62 The complaint de-
fined the class as "all purchasers of Maytag ranges/ovens, in the State, ,163
of Florida. Maytag filed a notice of removal and an affidavit in
support, which attested that 6729 ovens had been sold in Florida, the
total value of those ovens was approximately $5.9 million, the amount
in controversy exceeded $5 million, and, therefore, federal jurisdic-
tion was proper under CAFA. 64 The plaintiffs sought remand, ar-
guing that Maytag's assessment of the number of ovens may have in-
cluded ovens without the defective latch, and that the "total value"
156. Id. at 958. The court of appeals added that Bell could have presented a
"binding stipulation" on damages but "it is too late to do so now." Id. The court re-
jected the ad damnum clause as the equivalent, citing precedent. Id. at 958-59.
157. Id. at 959.
158. See Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 403 (6th Cir.
2007) (holding defendant that removed under CAFA failed to demonstrate the re-
quired amount in controversy by preponderance of evidence), discussed infra notes
172-180.
159. The Fourth Circuit also appears to have approved the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard. In Strawn, the court of appeals reversed the district court's deci-
sion to remand a case back to state court after it determined that AT&T met the
amount in controversy requirements. Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293,
299 (4th Cir. 2008). While the court of appeals did not specifically address the stan-
dard of proof under CAFA, the district court had applied the preponderance-of-the-
evidence test. Id.; Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 513 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (S.D.W.Va
2007). See also Bartnikowski v. NVR, Inc., 307 Fed. App'x 730, 734 (4th Cir. 2009)
(where damages were unspecified, "both parties agree that the defendant's burden in
these circumstances is to establish the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of
the evidence.").
160. 450 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006).
161. Id. at 1325, 1330.
162. Id. at 1324.
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had no real meaning. 5 The district court granted plaintiffs' motion
to remand after it found that Maytag failed to meet its burden that the
amount in controversy exceeded $5 million.'66
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court, de-
termining that the district court had applied the following rule:
"[w] here ... the plaintiff has not pled a specific amount of damages,
the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional require-
ment." 167 The court of appeals explained that determining whether
the preponderance-of-the-evidence test is met requires the court to
first consider the plaintiffs' complaint to determine whether, on its
face, the amount in controversy exceeds thejurisdictional amount.168
If the complaint does not establish thejurisdictional amount, then the
court looks to the notice of removal. 69 Finally, the court "may re-
quire evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the
case was removed.'170 After the district court examined Maytag's evi-
dence, the court correctly concluded that "great uncertainty" re-
mained about the amount in controversy; therefore, Maytag failed to
meet its burden on removal.
71
The Sixth Circuit has also adopted the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard in CAFA cases, and applied this standard to a plain-
tiff's complaint that limited damages below the $5 million threshold
under CAFA. 171 In Smith v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance
Co., 173 the plaintiffs sued Nationwide in Tennessee state court, claim-
ing that Nationwide did not restore plaintiffs' damaged vehicles to
their "prior appearance, function and value" under the terms of a set-
165. Id.
166. Id. Maytag argued that the district court erroneously applied a "certainty"
standard, but the Eleventh Circuit rejected this characterization of the district court's
decision. Id. at 1330.
167. Id. at 1330 (quoting Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.




171. Id. at 1332.
172. See Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 403 (6th Cir.
2007). Note that in the Eighth Circuit, the court would apply the preponderance-of-
the-evidence test in all cases, and in the Eleventh Circuit, the court would apply the
preponderance-of-the-evidence test where the damages were unspecified. But the
Eleventh Circuit has not yet held whether it will follow the Ninth Circuit, which ap-
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tlement agreement. 17 4 Plaintiffs' complaint specifically limited dam-
ages to $74,999 for each individual class member and $4,999,999 for
the class as a whole; plaintiffs specifically disclaimed punitive damag-
es.175 Nationwide filed a notice of removal contending that compensa-
tory damages would be at least $3.25 million, and that even a modest
punitive damage award pushed the amount in controversy over $5
million.7  The plaintiffs moved for remand, and the district court
granted the plaintiffs' motion.177
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, focusing
on two issues. First, the court of appeals held that a disclaimer that
limited damages in a complaint "does not preclude a defendant from
removing the matter to federal court upon a demonstration that
damages are 'more likely than not' to 'meet the amount in controver-•, ,, 178
sy requirement. Thus, the plaintiffs' attempt to limit damages
would not affect the burden on the defendant to show that removal
was proper. Second, the court held that because plaintiffs' claims
were limited to breach of contract, Nationwide could not argue that
punitive damages were at issue and should be included in the amount
in controversy. Punitive damages were not pled in the complaintS. 180
and normally were unavailable with contract claims.
C. Reasonable-Probability Test
The First, 18 Second, 18 and Seventh Circuits have applied the
"reasonable-probability" standard to determine whether a removing
defendant has shown that the $5 million amount in controversy re-
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 404.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 407.
179. Id. at 408.
180. Id.
181. Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2009)
(holding "reasonable probability" is a standard defendant must meet when removing
under CAFA; affirming decision to remove to state court); see also DiTolla v. Doral
Dental IPA of NewYork, 469 F.3d 271,277 (2nd Cir. 2006) (affirming remand to state
court after CAFA removal; no amount in controversy alleged in complaint, held, de-
fendant failed to demonstrate required amount in controversy).
182. Without explanation, the Second Circuit held that the proponent of federal
jurisdiction under CAFA must show that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 mil-
lion to a "reasonable probability." Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53,58 (2nd
Cir. 2006). Blockbu.terrelied on Mehlenbacherv. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291,296
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quirement is met under CAFA. The reasonable-probability test re-
quires the removing litigant to show what is at stake in the litigation,
considering both "what the stakes of the litigation could be" and what
the stakes of the litigation "are given the plaintiffs actual demands.",
8 3
In other words, the removing defendant must "sufficiently demon-
strate" that the amount in controversy is greater than CAFA'sjurisdic-
tional minimum.1 4 The Seventh Circuit was the first to adopt this
standard, eight months after Congress enacted CAFA.
185
S 186
In Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, the plaintiff class filed suit
against Countrywide in Illinois state court alleging that Countrywide
had violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), whichprohbit sening"jun .. .. . 187
prohibits sending 'junk" advertising faxes. The complaint did not
allege an amount of damages sought, nor did it limit damages.'
Countrywide filed a notice of removal under CAFA, contending that
the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million because Countrywide
had sent "at least 3,800 advertising faxes. "'89 Under the TCPA, Coun-
trywide argued it could be liable for $500 per fax, which could be
trebled if Countrywide acted willfully or knowingly, for a total of $5.7
million in controversy. 9 The district court remanded the case to
state court however, after determining that Countrywide had not
shown the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million (because the
plaintiff class might not be able to prove willfulness).19'
Relying on circuit precedent, the Seventh Circuit addressed the
standard of proof to demonstrate the amount in controversy in CAFA
cases and held that the removing defendant must show by a reasona-
ble probability that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.1
92
The problem, according to the Seventh Circuit, is that the "defendant
can't make the plaintiffs claim for him;" thus, the defendant need
only show by a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy
183. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005).
184. Amoche, 556 F.3d at 50 (citing Blockbuster, 472 F.3d at 58; Bri, 427 F.3d at
449).
185. See id.
186. 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
187. Id. at 447.
188. Id. at 447, 449.
189. Id. at 447.
190. Id.
191. Id. The court of appeals also considered whether the TCPA provided for ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the state courts and decided that it did not. Id.
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exceeds $5 million.1 13 The court of appeals reversed the district
court's decision, reasoning that Countrywide was not required to show
what Brill would recover, only what was "in controversy."'M Because
Countrywide had essentially admitted that 3800 faxes were sent, and
because Brill's complaint requested treble damages for willfulness, the
recovery of more than $5 million was not "legally impossible," accord-
ing to the court of appeals, leading to reversal of the district court's
decision. 1
95
The First Circuit joined the Second and Seventh circuits in
adopting the reasonable-probability test. '96 In Amoche v. Guarantee
Trust Life Insurance Co., the plaintiff class sued, in New Hampshire
State Court, an insurance company for a refund of the unearned por-
tion of premiums paid for life insurance policies obtained as part of a
vehicle financing. 97 The amended complaint also sought damages of
"over a million dollars in unearned premiums." 98 The plaintiffs won
their motion for partial summary judgment on liability, and at-
tempted to amend their complaint to expand the class of plaintiffs to
include from ten to twenty states.199 While the plaintiffs' motion was
under consideration, Guarantee Trust filed its notice of removal un-
der CAFA, contending that, since "hundreds of thousands" of policies
were at issue and the class would likely exceed 25,000 members, the
amount in controversy would exceed $5 million.200 The plaintiffs filed
a motion for remand,20' which the district court granted, based on its
critical review of the defendants' allegations of the amount in contro-
202versy.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 448.
195. Id.
196. Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2009)
(citing Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006); Brill, 427 F.3d at
449).
197. 556 F.3d at 43.
198. Id. at 45.
199. Id. at 44.
200. Id. at 45.
201. Id. After the briefing on the remand motion was complete, plaintiffs at-
tempted to reduce the class to thirteen states. Id. at 46. The defendants argued that
the district court could not consider post-removal events. Id.
202. Id. at 47. The district court found that Guarantee Trust's calculations were
not apparent from the face of the complaint, i.e., a simple estimation of the number
of plaintiffs and multiplication by the "expected" damages of $200.00 was insuffi-
cient. Id. Additionally, Guarantee Trust's estimate of refunds paid in New Hamp-
shire included refunds paid by other lenders, notjust Guarantee Trust, and this esti-
mate was unreliable for determining class-wide damages. Id.
2010]
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On appeal, Guarantee Trust contended that the court of appeals
should not adopt the reasonable-probability standard because the
analysis is "too rigorous." 103 Rather, Guarantee Trust argued that it
should be required to show merely that "it is not a legal certainty that
the amount in controversy is less than the jurisdictional minimum,"
which "mirrors the burden" plaintiffs would have if they had initially
filed in federal court.2 0 4 The court of appeals rejected Guarantee
Trust's argument and affirmed the district court. 20 Nothing in CAFA
showed that Congress intended to put plaintiffs and defendants in the
same position when seeking federal jurisdiction.2 6 And Guarantee
Trust's argument conflicted with the principle that plaintiffs are given
deference in their choice of forum.
Instead, the First Circuit adopted the reasonable-probability
standard.208 The reasonable-probability standard does not require
burden-shifting and avoids mini-trials on the amount in controversy;
preliminary issues should not result in "extensive and time consuming
litigation over the question of the amount in controversy in CAFA re-
moval cases. ,09 In addition, the reasonable-probability standard does
not permit plaintiffs to simply discredit the defense allegations, but
permits the court to consider facts or evidence provided by both par-
ties and evaluate both parties' showings. 210 Analysis of what both par-
ties have shown is critical because defendants have more knowledge of
211their conduct but plaintiffs have more knowledge of their injuries.
Finally, the amount in controversy should be judged at the time of
removal, and events subsequent to removal that reduce ultimate re-
covery to less than the jurisdictional minimum would not divest the
212federal court ofjurisdiction. The ultimate question in removal cas-
es is what amount is "in controversy," not what the plaintiff is likely to
recover. 2 3 After reviewing the record, the First Circuit affirmed the
203. Id. at 49.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 53.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 49.
208. Id. at 50 (citing Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006);
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005)).
209. Id. at 50 (citing Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 2001)).
210. Id. at 51.
211. Id. (citing Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 n.3 (11th Cir.
2006)).
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214
decision to remand to state court.
Interestingly, both the First and Seventh Circuits have suggested
that the reasonable-probability test is similar if not identical to the
preponderance-of-the-evidence test. In Meridian Security Insurance Co.
v. Sadowski, the Seventh Circuit decided a non-CAFA removal case and
reevaluated the reasonable-probability standard of proof that it had• . 215
announced in Brill and other cases. Meridian traced the Seventh
Circuit's adoption of the "reasonable-probability" test to the United
States Supreme Court decision in Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc. 6 and then
reviewed the Seventh Circuit's removal case law. Meridian com-
mented on the confusion in circuit court decisions created by the "le-
218gal-certainty" language from Red Cab . Ultimately, Meridian held that
the "proponent of federaljurisdiction must, if material factual allega-
tions are contested, prove those jurisdictional facts by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.",21 Meridian contended that the reasonable-
probability test overlaps substantially, if not fully, with the preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence test.22° But also Meridian "banished" reasonable
probability "from our lexicon" because it has "no provenance and no
following outside this circuit. ,221
The First Circuit in Amoche also stated that the reasonable-
probability standard was "for all practical purposes identical" to the
preponderance-of-the-evidence test already adopted by several cir-
cuits.2 2 2 Amoche explained that it preferred the "reasonable probabili-
ty" language because of the stage at which removal occurs. A notice
of removal is usually filed in the early stages of the litigation where lit-
tie evidence of damages is available.22 4 The preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard is generally reserved for resolving ultimate eviden-
225tiary disputes, not preliminary jurisdictional questions.
214. Id. at 53.
215. 441 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2006).
216. 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
217. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 541-42 (7th Cir. 2006).
218. Id. at 542-43 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
283, 288-89 (1938)).
219. Id. at 543.
220. Id. at 542.
221. Id. at 543.
222. Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41,50 (1st Cir. 2009) (cit-
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D. Combination of the Various Standards
The Ninth Circuit uses a combination of the legal-certainty and
preponderance-of-the-evidence-tests; which test applies turns on
plaintiff's allegations in the complaint. The legal-certainty test applies
when the plaintiff alleges damages greater than thejurisdictional min-
imum or specifically limits damages to less than $5 million."' The
preponderance-of-the-evidence test applies when the plaintiff does
not identiby an amount in controversy or make a specific demand for
damages.
In Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank, the plaintiff employee class sued in
Oregon state court, claiming that the bank's practice of rounding
hours worked to the nearest tenth of an hour caused plaintiffs to be
under-paid. 228 The class sought unpaid wages, damages for failure to
timely pay wages, penalty wages, and costs. 29 The complaint did not
attempt to limit the amount of damages sought through specific class
definitions. Rather, in the jurisdiction section, the complaint alleged
that "[t]he aggregate total of the claims pled herein [does] not ex-
ceed five million dollars," and, in the demand for relief, plaintiffs al-
leged that the sum was "in total, less than five million dollars. ,211 Af-
ter defendant removed under CAFA, the district court remanded,
reasoning it was bound by the complaint as to the amount in contro-
versy and defendant had not shown bad faith.23 '
Relying on two principles, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court after applying the "legal-certainty" test because the plaintiffs
had specifically limited damages to less than $5 million in the com-
232
plaint. First, the court emphasized that federal courts only have li-
226. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007).
227. Id. at 999.




232. Id. at 999. The dissent in Lowdermilk read the complaint as stating an unspe-
cified amount of damages. Id. at 1004 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). While the prayer for
relief stated that compensatory damages were limited to less than $5 million, Low-
dermilk also asked for attorneys' fees, which were available by statute for her unpaid
wage claims. Id. The dissent noted that, when attorneys' fees are available by statute,
the amount in controversy calculation must include the attorneys' fees in the analysis.
Id. In this case, it meant that Lowdermilk's complaint should be read as containing
an unspecified amount of damages and that, for example, she could recover
$4,999,999.00 in compensatory damages, and an unknown amount in attorneys' fees,
pushing her complaint over the jurisdictional amount. Id. The dissent would have
remanded the case for consideration under the less stringent preponderance-of-the-
evidence-standard. Id. at 1005.
1424 [Vol. 36:4
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mitedjurisdiction, which is "strictly construed. 233 Second, the legal-
certainty test protected the plaintiffs' choice of forum as the master of
the complaint by making it more difficult for defendants to remove
cases; this protection was warranted because plaintiffs had specifically
opted for a state-court forum by suing for less than the law allowed,
234
provided plaintiffs act in good faith. Consequently, where plaintiffs
have in good faith alleged damages below the jurisdictional amount, a
defendant who seeks removal under CAFA must (1) "overcome the
presumption against federal jurisdiction" and (2) "contradict the
plaintiff s own assessment of damages." 215 These principles, the court
216
of appeals concluded, were advanced by the legal-certainty test.
In contrast, the court of appeals noted that the preponderance-
of-the-evidence test applied where plaintiff failed to plead a specific
amount of damages and defendant removed. 237 However, where the
complaint filed in state court alleged an amount in excess of the fed-
eral jurisdiction requirement, then removal is allowed unless it ap-
pears to a legal certainty that the amount is less. 2"' Thus, the Ninth
Circuit embraces both the preponderance-of-the-evidence and the le-
gal-certainty tests, depending on allegations in the plaintiffs com-
plaint. The court of appeals acknowledged however, that the poten-
tial exists for "manipulation of the jurisdiction rules by plaintiffs."
239
Because CAFA eliminated the one-year limit on removal, the court
concluded the legal-certainty test strikes a balance, "leaving plaintiff
as master of her case, but giving defendants an option of a federal fo-
.240
rum.
233. Id. at 998 (majority opinion).
234. Id. at 998-99 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
283, 288-89 (1938)).
235. Id. at 999.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 998. Lowdermilk relies on a discussion in another CAFA case, AbregoAb-
rego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), as well as a non-
CAFA case, Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The Abrego discus-
sion is helpful, but the decision focused on other aspects of CAFAjurisdiction and
did not resolve the standard of proof for the amount in controversy. 443 F.3d at 683
n.8 ("As we are not presented with the question of the appropriate standard in such a
case, we reach no resolution here.").
238. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998.
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IV. THE PROPER STANDARD SHOULD BUILD ON SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT BUT HOLD THAT REMOVING DEFENDANT MUST PROVE
THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY MEETS JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS BY PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
Courts must strike a careful balance in construing federal juris-
diction statutes, like CAFA, to ensure that a neutral forum is available
for parties of diverse citizenship but prevent federal courts from being
flooded with unimportant cases.141 Traditionally, removal statutes are
strictly construed. The rules of statutory construction require that
courts adhere to the text of CAFA in light of Congress's intent; in
other words, courts should strictly construe the statute yet stop the
erosion of federal jurisdiction over class actions consistent with the
243provisions in CAFA.
A textual or strict construction of CAFA still leaves some open
questions, which courts have struggled to address. Looking at Con-
gress's intent is therefore important to answer these outstanding ques-
tions. Congress intended that CAFA would expand federal jurisdic-
tion over some class actions by making removal easier for
241. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005)
(holding Congress granted diversityjurisdiction "[i] n order to provide a neutral fo-
rum" and adopted amount in controversy requirements "[t]o ensure that diversity
jurisdiction does not flood the federal courts with minor disputes"). For legal author-
ities discussing the need for courts to strike a balance, see, e.g., Smithers v. Smith, 204
U.S. 632, 645 (1907) (federal court authority to dismiss action is "obviously not unli-
mited" given jurisdiction is summarily decided without trial); Deutsch v. Hewes St. Real-
ty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting difficulties arise in developing
"clear andjust" rules to determine amount in controversy because "major considera-
tions tug in precisely opposite directions."); WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 16-17.
242. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) ("[T] he policy
of successive acts of Congress regulating thejurisdiction of federal courts is one call-
ing for the strict construction of [reversal statutes]."). See also Miedema v. Maytag
Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (11 th Cir. 2006) (citing caselaw supporting the propo-
sition that [t]he rule of construing removal statutes strictly and resolving doubts in
favor of remand ... is well-established.").
243. The rules of statutory construction are thoroughly discussed in Allapattah,
545 U.S. at 558:
We must not give jurisdictional statutes a more expansive interpretation
than their text warrants, but it is just as important not to adopt an artifi-
cial construction that is narrower than the text provides.... [W]e must
examine the statute's text in light of context, structure, and related statu-
tory provisions.
(citation omitted)). Congress's concern about the erosion of federaljurisdiction over
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244
defendants, yet it modified only some of the rules and remained si-
lent on others.245 CAFA expressly abrogated the complete diversity
rule, allowed any defendant to remove without the consent of other
defendants, eliminated the one-year deadline for removal, and made
246
interlocutory review readily available. Yet of the amount in contro-
versy, CAFA said both something and nothing. To qualify for CAFA
removal, the amount in controversy must exceed $5 million when all
plaintiffs' claims are aggregated. 4  By what standard of proof the
2481
amount must be proven was left to federal case law.
Whether CAFA altered the standard to prove the amount in con-
troversy is a good question. Congress has the authority to change and
expand federal jurisdiction, and Congress has previously regulated
federaljurisdiction by authorizing and controlling the amount in con-
troversy.249 By enacting CAFA, Congress was similarly expanding fed-
eral jurisdiction to class action cases by relaxing the standards to ob-
tain removal from state court. Attention has naturally focused on the
244. Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 47-48 (lst Cir. 2009)
("CAFA also made a federal forum more accessible to removing defendants by impos-
ing only a minimal diversity requirement, eliminating the statutory one-year time lim-
it for removal, and providing for interlocutory appeal of a federal district court's re-
mand order."); Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2006)
("Congress enacted CAFA with the purpose of, inter alia, expanding the availability
of diversity jurisdiction for class action lawsuits.").
245. Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 2008) ("While
CAFA expressly altered certain requirements for asserting diversityjurisdiction and
removing class actions, it did not reverse the established principles for alleging and
demonstrating jurisdiction on removal.").
246. See discussion supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
247. See discussion supra note 43 and accompanying text.
248. Federal case law developed more rapidly than is probably usual because
CAFA liberalized interlocutory appeal procedures. See discussion supra notes 50-53
and accompanying text. See also Strawn, 530 F.3d at 297 (noting that Congress passed
CAFA with knowledge of interpretation courts have given federal jurisdiction).
249. As the Supreme Court stated again recently, "In Finley we emphasized that
'[w] hatever we say regarding the scope ofjurisdiction conferred by a particular sta-
tute can of course be changed by Congress.'" Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 557 (2005) (quoting Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556
(1989)). In the same decision, the Court noted that Congress has altered the amount
in controversy as it has seen fit in part because that is not a constitutional element of
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 554. See also id. at 562 (noting amount in controversy is a
statutory prerequisite which the courts construe claim by claim also observing it has
"no inherent logical connection" to diversity). Congress has chosen to require and
then not require an amount in controversy as well as changed the amount required.
See generally id. at 562 (discussing that federal-question jurisdiction formerly had an
amount-in-controversy requirement and holding that § 1367(a) unambiguously over-
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amount in controversy-a key component of the removal analysis.
Five years after CAFA was enacted, federal case law provides a variety
of answers to the question posed above: did the standard to prove the
amount in controversy change under CAFA?1
5
0
Choosing the correct answer is largely dictated by Supreme Court
precedent and federal court of appeals decisions that were handed
down pre-CAFA and which addressed the standard of proof for the
amount in controversy. Federal case law on a related CAFA question
informs this analysis. Every court of appeals to consider which party
bears the burden of proving the amount in controversy under CAFA
has logically concluded that the burden must be on the party asserting
federal jurisdiction.25' That has always been the rule; Congress is
deemed to have known the existing rule of law, and CAFA did not ex-
252pressly change the rule. Yet this parallel only goes so far. The stan-
dard of proof does not benefit from the same clear pre-existing rule;
in fact, there has always been some controversy about how to apply
Red Cab and McNutt in different removal scenarios even before
CAFA, 25 which has only intensified the search for consistency in CAFA
254
cases.
250. See cases discussed supra Part III.
251. See cases cited supra notes 21 & 59.
252. Seecases cited supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. Also see the analy-
sis of CAFA's legislative history in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446,
447-49 (7th Cir. 2005):
When a law sensibly could be read in multiple ways, legislative history may
help a court understand which of these received the political branches'
imprimatur. But when the legislative history stands by itself, as a naked
expression of "intent" unconnected to any enacted text, it has no more
force than an opinion poll of legislators-less, really, as it speaks for fewer..
•. To change [the burden of proof for the amount in controversy], Con-
gress must enact a statute with the President's signature (or by a two-thirds
majority to override a veto).
See also Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) ("In the absence of
a clear textual directive to alter such a long established principle of federal jurisdic-
tion, we decline to do so."); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11 th Cir.
2006) (holding CAFA's silence suggests burden of proof remains unchanged).
253. See discussion supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Meridian
Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536,539-41 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing McNutt and
Red Cab in non-CAFA class action, applying preponderance-of-the-evidence as correct
test).
254. For example, the Third Circuit's discussion of Red Cab and McNutt is nothing
less than intense. SeeFrederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193-95 (3rd Cir. 2007).
Much, if not most, of the CAFA case law that has considered the correct standard of
proof for the amount in controversy has cited Red Cab and McNutt. See, e.g., Bell v.
Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953,956 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Red Cab); Bri, 427 F.3d at 448
(citing Red Cab); Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir.
1428 [Vol. 36:4
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The lack of a uniform rule among the federal courts of appeal on
the standard of proof is problematic, especially under CAFA. 21 5 Non-
uniformity allows plaintiffs to manipulate federal jurisdiction by
256
choosing a forum with favorable analysis. To some extent, the Fed-
eralJudicial Center statistics on the filing of class actions since CAFA
257
suggest this may be happening. Significantly more plaintiffs are ac-
tually choosing to file class actions in federal court and fewer removals
258
are happening now than when CAFA was first enacted. This mani-
pulation is exactly what Congress intended to prevent by enacting
CAFA.
Because the legal-certainty test from Red Cab is "the universal
test" to ascertain whether the amount in controversy has been estab-
lished,259 it obviously plays a role under CAFA. The legal-certainty test
will apply where plaintiffs file an original class action in federal court
260and assert an amount in controversy over $5 million. If the defen-
dant seeks remand to state court, it must prove to a legal certainty that
261plaintiffs' claim does not exceed $5 million. Similarly, where plain-
tiffs file a similar class action complaint alleging damages exceeding
$5 million in state court and the defendant removes it, the notice of
removal may rely on the damages alleged in the complaint.26z The
plaintiffs could in turn seek remand to state court and the legal-
2009) (citing McNutt); Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 999 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citing Red Cab); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184,1209-10 (11 th
Cir. 2007) (citing McNutt).
255. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1330 n.8 (observing that federal courts should not be
left with "lingering doubts" about subject matter jurisdiction, particularly under
CAFA which favors a "swift resolution" ofjurisdictional disputes).
256. This is essentially the point made in the Senate Report issued in support of
CAFA's adoption. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 1-2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3-5 (act
first considered by 105th Congress). Prior to CAFA, plaintiffs manipulated federal
jurisdiction by adding parties to destroy diversity or by eliminating parties with claims
under the jurisdictional amount. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Post-
CAFA, plaintiffs may manipulate federaljurisdiction by tailoring the complaint's alle-
gations to reduce the chances of removal depending on what standard of proof has
been adopted by the forum in which they file.
257. See FED.JUDICIAL CTR. REPORT, supra note 13, at app. B, fig. 4. Two of the
three federal circuits that have experienced an increase in original CAFA filings are
the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal. Id. Both of these circuits apply the
legal-certainty test to determine the amount in controversy in a manner that is argua-
bly more favorable to plaintiffs who seek to ensure federaljurisdiction. See discussion
supra Part III.A.
258. See discussion supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
259. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291 (1938).
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263
certainty test would apply to that challenge.
This application of Red Cab is true to the Supreme Court's analy-
sis because in that case the complaint filed in state court alleged an
amount in controversy sufficient for federaljurisdiction, but after the
defendant removed, the plaintiff sought to lower the amount in con-
troversy by attaching evidence of the actual damages to the amended
complaint. 264 The Supreme Court applied the legal-certainty test and
upheld the removal to federal court because the plaintiff is master of
265the complaint-which alleged the requisite amount in controversy.
But the Court rejected amendments to the complaint and held that
actual damages did not affect the amount in controversy because fed-
eral jurisdiction does not depend upon the actual amount recov-
ered.266
Red Cab has its limits when applied to CAFA cases. The federal
rules now allow for the liberal amendment of the complaint, especial-
ly before an answer is filed, which is often the time for CAFA remov-267
al. The federal rules had not been adopted when the complaint in
Red Cab was filed and amendment was not previously granted liberal-
ly.268 Also, Red Cab gave great deference to the plaintiff's allegations
about the amount in controversy based on the Court's conclusion that
collusion was unlikely between plaintiff and defendant to achieve fed-
269eral jurisdiction. Collusion may remain unlikely today, but Con-
263. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc., 479 F.3d 994,999 (9th Cir. 2007) (not-
ing legal-certainty standard when applied to party challenging federal jurisdiction
"maintains symmetry"); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the legal-certainty standard from Red Cab "applies to
removed cases no less than to those filed initially in federal court").
264. Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 285.
265. Id. at 290 (reasoning that plaintiff chooses his forum but is subject to chal-
lenge by defense removal); see also id. at 294 (explaining in dicta that plaintiff may
"resort to the expedient of suing for less than the jurisdictional amount" and less
than he is entitled, in which case, "the defendant cannot remove").
266. Id. at 292-93 (holding that where plaintiff after removal "by stipulation, by
affidavit, or by amendment of his pleadings" reduces the claim to less than thejuris-
dictional amount, the district court does not losejurisdiction because these are events
subsequent to removal which do not "oust" jurisdiction "once it has attached"). See
alsoAmoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 51 (st Cir. 2009) (holding
the same).
267. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a) (allowing amendments before trial once "as a matter of
course" before being served with responsive pleading or within twenty days after serv-
ing pleading if no responsive pleading is allowed; with other amendments, "court
should freely give leave when justice so requires").
268. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note to 1937 adoption, subdiv. b
("Compare [former] Equity Rule 19 (Amendments Generally) and code provisions
which allow an amendment "at any time in furtherance ofjustice....").
269. Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 290-91 (holding that "[t]here is a strong presumption
1430 [Vol. 36:4
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/5
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
gress has found significant manipulation of federal jurisdiction by var-
ious pleading devices. 270
Where the plaintiff files in state court and alleges less than $5
million, it makes little sense to apply the legal-certainty test, as the
Third Circuit does.27' Requiring a removing defendant to prove the
amount in controversy by a legal certainty is an inversion of Red Cab,
as the Eighth Circuit's decision noted. The legal-certainty test is
applied to defeat federaljurisdiction, not establish it. Also, any limi-
tations on damages that the plaintiff inserts in the ad damnum clause
are alone insufficient to defeat jurisdiction; these limitations do not
bind plaintiffs in many jurisdictions and are prohibited in others,
leading to non-uniform results within the same federal circuit de-
274pending on the state court of origin. In any event, these limitations
are generally motivated by manipulation of federal jurisdiction, which
CAFA seeks to curtail.
Where the plaintiff files in state court and alleges less than $5
million in controversy, the three-pronged approach adopted by the
Ninth Circuit for CAFA removal poses problems. First, which prong
applies turns on what the plaintiff has alleged and, therefore, neces-
275
sarily is susceptible to manipulation. This is unfair to defendants
who are always somewhat at a disadvantage in establishing the amount
in controversy for removal (the amount of damages is plaintiffs claim
276
to make in the first instance) . By linking the standard of proof re-
that the plaintiff has not claimed a large amount in order to confer federal jurisdic-
tion" in a case originally filed in state court because "[i] t is highly unlikely that the
parties would pursue this roundabout and troublesome method").
270. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part III.A.
272. Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 957-58 (8th Cir. 2009).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 958; Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 407 (6th Cir.
2007) (holding that a disclaimer in a complaint does not preclude a defendant from
removing to federal court upon proof that damages are likely to meet the jurisdic-
tional amount but is sufficient absent proof offered by defendant). SeeFED. R. CIrv. P.
54(c) (providing that "final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings"); see also
WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 51.
275. Bell, 557 F.3d at 958. The Ninth Circuit commented that "the potential for
manipulation" exists and "gamesmanship is possible under our rules," but would be
in bad faith. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc., 479 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir.
2007). The court added, however, that when plaintiffs are uncertain about damages,
they are not "obligated to overstate their damages to satisfy the defendant's interest
in a federal forum, but may plead conservatively to secure a state forum." Id. at 1003.
276. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 999 n.5 (noting the "irony" of a plaintiff diminishing
damages and a defendant augmenting damages); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans,
2010]
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quired to establish the amount in controversy for removal, the three-
pronged approach heightens the disadvantage to the defense. Ulti-
mately, the application of the legal-certainty test in some cases, and
the preponderance-of-the-evidence test in other cases, may encourage
forum shopping. At least some plaintiffs would avoid those states that
preclude any allegation of the amount of money damages, preferring
those states that allow these allegations, because the allegations trig-
ger the legal-certainty test.
Where the plaintiff files in state court and alleges less than $5
million in controversy or is silent, the defendant who removes has the
burden of proving the amount in controversy; therefore, the notice of
removal must address it, and a court may require competent proof
under McNutt."' The applicable standard of proof for the party as-
sertingjurisdiction where the complaint does not allege the requisite
amount in controversy is preponderance of the evidence." If the
removing defendant meets this standard, then the plaintiff must de-
feat federal jurisdiction by proving the amount in controversy is less
279than the CAFA requirement by a legal certainty.
Although McNutt was originally filed in federal court and not re-
moved, the Supreme Court decided that a federal court could require
competent proof where the amount in controversy was in dispute and
that, to successfully maintain federaljurisdiction, the party asserting it
must prove the required amount by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.180 This test has survived for decades and works in the CAFA
281context.
The preponderance-of-the-evidence test does no damage to
plaintiff as master of the complaint. Where the complaint is silent on
the amount of damages, the plaintiff has failed to assert mastery of the
complaint. Where the complaint has alleged an amount of damages,
the courts will presume the alleged sum is a good faith statement of
Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The complication is that a removing defen-
dant can't make the plaintiff's claim for him .... ").
277. McNuttv. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178,189 (1936).
278. See supra Part III.B. See also Amoche v. Guar. Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41,
50 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[T]he reasonable probability standard is, to our minds, for all
practical purposes identical to the preponderance standard adopted by several cir-
cuits."); Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 542 (7th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that preponderance of the evidence and reasonable probability have the same
meaning but banishing reasonable probability because it has created confusion over
application of Red Cab).
279. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
280. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 179, 189.
281. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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the amount in controversy. 2 Further, plaintiff may maintain greater
control over the amount in controversy by carefully tailoring the class
definition (e.g., number of states, years, products included) or enter-
ing into a binding stipulation to limit damages (although that may• .283
pose ethical issues, particularly in a class action).
V. CONCLUSION
A circuit split exists on what is the correct standard of proof for
determining the amount in controversy when a defendant removes to
federal court under CAFA. This circuit disagreement started, in part,
with a pre-existing controversy about how to apply Supreme Court
precedent on the same question for removal generally. The crucial
precedent is the Court's decisions in Red Cab in 1938 and McNutt in
1936, which do not refer to each other and have not been discussed in
any detail by the Supreme Court since the decisions were issued. Be-
cause CAFA is silent on the standard of proof, yet in many other ways
opened the federal courts to expanded removal of class actions, ap-
pellate courts have disagreed and understandably struggled with
CAFA's impact on the Red Cab-McNutt analysis. The Eighth Circuit's
analysis of the standard of proof is most consistent with Supreme
Court precedent because it focuses on whether a party is seeking to
establish or defeat jurisdiction and also gives plaintiffs their due as
master of the complaint. The legal-certainty test applies to defeat
federal jurisdiction, but not to establish it. Where proof of the
amount in controversy is required, the party asserting federaljurisdic-
tion must support the requisite amount by a preponderance of the
evidence. Finally, the preponderance-of-the-evidence test is consistent
with CAFA's provisions that make it easier to remove class actions to
federal courts as well as Congress's stated goal of stemming the ero-
sion of federal jurisdiction at plaintiffs' caprice.
282. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 290 (1938) (plaintiff
"knows or should know whether his claim is within the statutory requirement as to
amount. His good faith in choosing the federal forum is open to challenge .... ").
283. Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 2009). See also Lowdermilk v.
U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc., 479 F.3d 994, 999 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that plaintiff
may stipulate to damages to avoid federal court).
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